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Abstract. This paper surveys some recent work done by the author and 
others on a differential game model of capitalism which was originally 
developed by Kelvin Lancaster. Economic growth and income distribution 
are here modelled as a game between workers, who may consume or save, and 
capitalists, who may consume or invest. The assumptions made and the 
results obtained are discussed with a view to pointing out possible av- 
enues of future research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nearly sixty years ago Ramsey (1928) pion- 
eered in a new field of economic theory 
which we nowadays call optimal economic 
growth. His work was more or less ignored 
during the rise of Keynesian macroeconomics 
when unemployment and inflationwere regard- 
ed as the pressing issues. In many respects 
Ramsey’s analysis was already quite general 
and it was extended in a number of ways, 
for example, by allowing for many capital 
goods, population growth, technical pro- 
gress and uncertainty in the 1960’s c for 
a survey see, for example, Wan (1971, 
Ch 1011. This new theoretical interest in 
the issues of optimal economic growth arose 
as a direct consequence of the advances 
made in growth theory and control theory. 
Pontryagin’s maximum principle was quickly 
adopted by economists. 
In the heydays of the applications of op- 
timal control theory to the modelling of 
economic growth, distributional issues were 
much neglected. This must have reflected 
the bias of the general economics profes- 
sion to questions of growth as well as the 
immaturity of the methods which were avail- 
able to deal with dynamic conflicts. 
The first game-theoretic approach to 
distributional issues was formulated by 
Phelps and Pollak (1968), who viewed econ- 
omic growth and distribution as an inter- 
generational conflict. Assuming that the 
present generation derives its utility from 
the consumption pattern of infinitely many 
nonoverlapping generations but that it can 
only control its own saving rate, they de- 
monstrated that the Nash equilibrium of 
this intergenerational game results in 
under-saving. Their model cannot, however, 
be expressed in the framework of different- 
ial game theory, and, therefore, we shall 
not review the works based on thisapproach. 
The first study applying differential game 
theory to the modelling of growth and dis- 
tribution is due to Lancaster (1973). He 
took up the’ issues, studied by the classic- 
al economists Malthus, Ricardo and Marx, 
of capital accumulation and the distribu- 
tion of income between the social classes 
and formulated them as a simple two-player 
noncooperative differential game between 
workers and capitalists. This model will 
be described in the next section, after 
which the existing models generalizing 
Lancaster’s approach are reviewed. In con- 
cluding the paper we shall also point out 
possible avenues of future research. 
LANCASTER’S MODEL 
Lancaster (1973) considered a one-sector 
single technique economy whose output X(t) 
at any given time t may be consumed or 
added to the existing stock K(t) and in 
which labour is never a limiting factor 
and capital lasts forever. It is assumed 
that the workers can control their share 
of consumption in total output, 
C,(t)/X(t), 
u,(t) = 
withln given instltutional ll- 
mlts: c < u (t) 5 b for all t, c 
being constints such that 0 c c < b 
and b 
and 
l/2 < b < 1. This is interpreted to mean 
that this social organization would not 
survive if the workers’ share of consump- 
tion in output were less than c or greater 
than b. The assumption that they can ob- 
tain more than half of output is important 
and, we believe, realistic in the analysis 
that follows. The capitalists’ control 
variable is u,(t) = I(t)/[X(t)-C,(t)], the 
share of investment in output which is not 
consumed by the workers. This variable is 
assumed free to vary over the closed “nit 
interval: 0 5 u,(t) < 1 for all t. 
Let a denote the output-capital ratio and 
T be the length of the planning horizon. 
Assume that workers and capitalists have 
somehow devised piecewise-continuous (open- 
loop) strategies ut i [O,Tl+\:;;i ar~,“,;~; 
[O,Tl+[O,11, respcct1ve1y. 
consumotion is then given by 
T 
Jl(u1,u2) = I 
0 
Cl(t)dt = ; aK(t)ul(t)dt,(l) 
0 
italist consumption by and total cap 
T 
.I (u1,u2) = J 
T2 0 
I aK(t) [l-u1 
0 
C2(t)dt = 
(t)l [l-u,(t)] dt . (2) 
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The state variable, i.e. the capital stock, 
is determined by 
K(t) I I(t) = aK(t)[l-ul(t'l+(t) ; 
K(0) I Kg ' 0 . -. (3) 
We are now interested in the situation 
where each player chooses his strategy, 
so as to maximize the respective 
ul 
ZfiYgrIon function (1) or (2) 
the state equation (3) and the' 
subject to 
assumption 
made about the rationality of the other 
player. Lancaster (1973) derived the open- 
loop Nash equilibrium of this differential 
game and showed the solution to consist of 
two phases: in the first phase workers 
consume minimally (u,(t) z c) and capital- 
ists invest maximally (u,(t) = l), whilst 
in the second both classes consume at the 
maximum rate (u,(t) I b , u,(t) = O),which 
means that accumulation has ceased. The 
switch takes place at t = T - l/a (l-b) , 
where 1 is assumed large enough to make 
t positive. It is the instant at which 
the value of investment to the capitalists 
falls below that of consumption. As Lan- 
caster points out, the workers value in- 
vestment higher than consumption at F 
since they can receive more than half of 
future output (b > l/Z). However, it is 
not optimal for them to save when the capi- 
talists have stopped investing. Workers 
cannot force capitalists to accumulate 
against the latter's best interest. 
Lancaster's open-loop equilibrium also 
qualifies as the feedback equilibrium be- 
cause the differential game defined in 
equations (1) - (3) is state separable , 
i.e. neither the Hamiltonian-maximizing 
conditions nor the costate equations of 
the players depend on the state variable. 
By comparing the noncooperative equilibri- 
um with the cooperative solution which was 
obtained under the assumption that saving 
and investment decisions are derived so as 
to maximize total (worker plus capitalist) 
consumption, Lancaster demonstrated that 
both social classes could obtain more con- 
sumption under cooperation. This result 
follows from the fact that the optimal 
switch point is t* = T - l/a and , thus, 
t* > t. His important conclusion was that 
the Keynesian separation of saving and in- 
vestment decisions results in dynamic in- 
efficiency. Later Hoe1 (1978) showed that 
the game solution does not usually belong 
to the set of Pareto-optimal solutions and 
that it results in lower capital accumu- 
lation than all the cooperative solutions. 
Before turning to consider these extensions 
of the Lancaster model let us observe that 
his model has both a (neo-)Marxian and 
Keynesian flavour. It is distinctly Mar- 
xian in the sense that he studies a labour- 
surplus economy and assumes that the work- 
ers can control income distribution in any 
given period by being able to set the 
share of their consumption in total out- 
put. Thus, distribution is prior to accu- 
mulatlon. The capitalists are assumed to 
control accumulation by being able to 
choose the share of investment in the sur- 
plus, i.e. ,in output which is not consumed 
by the workers. This disjunction of saving 
and investment decisions brings in SOllll? 
Keynesian flavour. 
EXTENSIONS OF THE LANCASTER MODEL 
Table 1 summarizes the dynamic game models 
based on the Lancaster approach. It also 
contains the contributions of Hamada (19671, 
Marglin (19761, Stanley(1978) and Hammer 
(19811, in which the framework is somewhat 
different from Lancaster's. In these ’ 
studies the government chooses the time 
path of income redistribution From workers 
to capitalists whose fixed saving rate is 
higher than that of the former class so as 
to maximize a weighted average of the work- 
er and capitalist welfare. We have includ- 
ed these applications of optimal control 
theory in the Pareto-optrmal solutions of 
"capitalism games". 
The original Lancaster model has been tech- 
nically extended in a number of ways. Hoe1 
(1978) studied the implications of diminish- 
ing returns to capital, which make the 
state equation (3) nonlinear in the capital 
stock. Infinite horizon, nonlinear utility 
functions and the full-employment con- 
straint have been introduced in Pohjola 
(1985). 
The explanation For the dynamic inefficien- 
cy displayed In these studies is a dynamic 
externality. One group's decision to save 
and invest for the future is affected by 
the fact that the accumulated amount may be 
consumed by some other group. Rationally 
acting players take into account this pub- 
lic good nature of provision for the Future 
and, consequently, save and invest less 
than they would do under cooperation. Ex- 
ternalities also arise under other speci- 
fications of growth and distribution simi- 
lar to those arising from the worker-capi- 
talist conflict. An example is an economy 
where the working class is not a single 
decision-making unit but has organized it- 
self in a number of competing unions [Poh- 
jola (1984a)l. I have argued in Pohjola 
(1985) that we can explain in terms of this 
externality many current economic problems, 
such as high real wages, slow growth and 
unemployment, From a new viewpoint. 
Ways of reducing the welfare loss which 
arises From the lack of cooperation between 
the social classes have been examined in a 
few studies. In Pohjola (1983bl it is de- 
monstrated that a partral transfer of con- 
trol over the investment decision from 
capitalists to workers improves both play- 
er's welfare. Such a transfer of economic 
power is an essential Feature of the worker 
investment Funds established recently in 
Sweden. Buhl and Machaczek (1985) have ex- 
tended this approach by considering the 
implications of the worker ownership of 
capital. Their conclusion is that ineffici- 
ency is sharply reduced because such an 
ownership makes workers less dependent on 
capitalists' behaviour. 
In Pohjola (1983a) we have compared the 
Nash solution of the Lancaster game with 
the open-loop Stackelberg solution. It 
turned out that both players prefer the 
Stackelberg Formulation but that neither 
workers nor capitalists want to act as the 
leader. This means that the game is in a 
stalemate. The result can be interpreted 
along the following lines. As was explain- 
ed in section 2, the workers value invest- 
ment hrgher than consumption at t, the In- 
stant at which the capitalists stop invest- 
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Table 1. Capitalism Games 
Information 
structure 
Noncooperative solutions 
Nash Stackelberg 
Cooperative solutions 
Pareto Nash’s threat 
bargaining 
Open loop Lancaster (1973) Pohjola (1983a) Hamada(1967) Pohjola(l984b) 
Hoe1 (1978) Lancaster (1973) 
Pohjola (1983b, Marglin (1976) 
1984a, 1985) Hoe1 (1978) 
Buhl & Machaczek Stanley (1978) 
(1985) Hammer (1981) 
Pohjola (1985) 
Feedback Lancaster (1973) Elasar, Haurie & 
Pohjola (1963b, Ri:ci (1985) 
1984a, 1985) 
Bagar, Haurie & 
Ricci (1985) 
Closed loop Haurie b Pohjola 
(1985) 
ing. This means that the workers would 
save for a longer period if they could con- 
trol investment. As the leader in the 
Stackelberg game they obtain such a control 
by offering their savings over a given in- 
terval beyond t as compensation to capital- 
ists for an extension of investment activ- 
ity. The workers have to follow this strat- 
egy since they have no control over the 
investment decision. Under the capitalists’ 
leadership they obtain similar results 
without such a sacrifice in consumption. 
Our conclusion is, however, sensitive to 
the assumption about the information struc- 
ture, as EaDar, Haurie and Ricci (1985) 
have pointed out. They showed that both 
players want the capitalists to act as the 
leader in the feedback Stackelberg game. 
Under the workers’ leadership the Stackel- 
berg solution is equivalent to the Feed- 
back Nash equilibrium. In economic terms 
this conclusion follows from the neo-Marx- 
ian assumption concerning income distri- 
bution and it demonstrates the importance 
to the workers of a period of commitment. 
This assumption places the players in an 
asymmetric position since the capitalists’ 
decision u (t) in period t is independent 
of the war ers’ i? choice u,(t). The invest- 
ment share u,(t) does, however, depend on 
ul(sl,s > t. This means that as the lead- 
er of the game workers can influence capi- 
talists’ current choice of u*(t) by commit- 
ting themselves to low wage shares only in 
the future, i.e. only by applying an open- 
loop control. This explains why the open- 
loop Stackelberg solution with the workers 
as the leader may dominate the correspond- 
ing Nash solution and also why the feed- 
back Stackelberg solution with the workers 
as the leader is equivalent to the feed- 
back Nash solution. The latter result fol- 
lows from the fact that in the feedback 
Stackelberg game the leader can commit him- 
self to the’ current period choice only. 
The situation is different under the capi- 
talists’ leadership since u,(t) depends on 
u,(t) in a direct way as well. Consequent- 
ly, the leader can influence the follower’s 
choice even under the feedback information 
structure. It is interesting to observe 
that in the practice of incomes policy it 
is the workers who apply open-loop strat- 
egies. 
The Nash bargaining solution and the opti- 
mal threats announced by the social classes 
to affect the negotiated solution to their 
own advantage are examined in Pohjola 
(1984b). It is demonstrated that the work- 
ers’ threat takes the Form of refusing to 
accept low wages while capitalists threaten 
to refrain from investing. The threats as 
well as the possible gains from cooperation 
determine the players’ relative importance, 
or bargaining power, and it is shown that 
capitalists are in general in a stronger 
position than workers. 
The basic weakness of the axiomaticbargain- 
ing approach, which was originally develop- 
ed for games in the normal form, is its 
essentially static nature. It is necessary 
to assume that the agreement reached in the 
beginning of the game is binding for both 
players over the whole time horizon on 
which the game is played. This assumption 
is most restrictive since it practically 
eliminates the possibility for the players 
to adapt their controls dynamically. EC@n- 
omit growth and distributions are, after 
all, the results of the inherent conflict 
and complementarity of labour and capital 
in a fully dynamic context with the possi- 
bility of making as well as breaking agree- 
ments which may be either formal or inform- 
al. It is this aspect of the real 1iFe 
which is modelled by Haurie and Pohjola 
(1985) by applying closed-loop strategies 
with memory to an infinite-horizon version 
of the Lancaster model developed in Pohjola 
(1985). They demonstrate that efficient 
equilibria can be constructed by assuming 
that the players choose a compound strategy 
whereby they play an agreed uponcooperatlve 
policy if neither of them has cheated in 
the past whereas they apply the feedback 
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Nash controls For the rest of the game 
otherwise. The original Lancaster result 
as well as its extension are consequently 
shown to be Fragile with respect to the 
assumption concerning the information,. 
structure of the game. Thus neither the 
Marxlan conflict between wages and profits 
nor the Keynesian disjunction between sav- 
ing and investment decisions, as perceived 
in this game-theoretic Framework, necess- 
arily explain the observed inefficlencles 
in the development of capitalist economies. 
They suggest that we have to turn to games 
of imperfect information to explain these 
phenomena. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The games of distribution and growth 
surveyed here have not yet reached the 
maturity of optimal growth theory models. 
Much technical work 1s needed before we 
will be able to characterize the solutions 
to these problems without having to resort 
to special utility and production func- 
tions. Other possible avenues of Future 
research might also include attempts to 
generalize the distribution theory applied 
in the Lancaster type models. An obvious 
alternative to the Marxian approach is the 
Keynesian theory in which effective demand 
plays a crucial role. Attempts by growth 
theorists to explain the distribution of 
wealth between the social classes would 
also benefit from a game-theoretic ap- 
preach. 
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